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Abstract This paper examines whether the evolving jurisprudence on
necessity as developed by the WTO adjudicatory bodies reﬂects the same
balance between trade liberalization and regulatory autonomy as that
contained in the WTO treaty texts, particularly with regard to the GATT.
It is argued that a divergence can be observed which raises questions
of competence, legitimacy and transparency. Speciﬁc amendments to
the prevailing test are also proposed in order to achieve what the author
suggests is a textually consistent, and thus legitimate, necessity test of equal
efﬁcacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
A signiﬁcant and ongoing challenge facing the WTO system is how to balance
the pursuit of free trade with the need to afford sufﬁcient space for the dom-
estic regulatory autonomy of its Members. The various actions taken by
Members choosing to promote national policy objectives purportedly aimed at
addressing non-trade issues such as environmental protection, labour rights,
human health and consumer protection (often in response to the demands of
the domestic constituency) have reignited the ongoing battle. The WTO
Agreement simultaneously aims to encourage trade liberalization by con-
demning measures that illegitimately advantage domestic industry, while
speciﬁcally carving out multiple exceptions to allow sufﬁcient space for the
pursuit of other important policy objectives. The factual basis for this difﬁ-
culty lies in the fact that a Member’s decision to regulate often advantages
domestic industry, though the measure may not necessarily have been drafted
with any protectionist intent. Thus, the issue facing the WTO adjudicatory
bodies is whether the measure is legitimately aimed at non-trade goals with
unintentional but unavoidable consequences for international trade or a dis-
guised attempt to protect or boost domestic industry. The issue has perhaps
gained more importance recently in light of the current economic crisis, to
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which many Members have responded by enacting measures aimed at sup-
porting domestic industry crucial to the survival of their domestic economies.
It is clear that the primary tool selected by the Members to distinguish
between illegitimate protectionist measures and legitimate exceptions, and
thus balance the dual objectives of increased trade liberalization and allowing
Members sufﬁcient space to pursue non-trade objectives, is the necessity test.
Appearing in slightly different forms throughout the various agreements,1
necessity tests have been used to reﬂect the extent of the Members’ political
compromise depending on the object and purpose of the agreement, expand-
ing the scope afforded to domestic autonomy in some, while restricting it in
others. However, the application of these tests by the WTO adjudicatory
bodies has raised concern over the degree of deference afforded to Members’
legitimate policy objectives, raising questions of legitimacy, competence and
transparency.2
I will explore the question of whether this evolving jurisprudence reﬂects
the same balance between trade liberalization and regulatory autonomy as that
contained in the treaty texts, particularly with regard to the GATT. I will focus
on the extent to which the adjudicating bodies’ application of certain doctrinal
tools when interpreting necessity has inﬂuenced the freedom afforded to
domestic regulatory choices when faced with their negative trade conse-
quences. Attention will also be paid to the parallel development emerging
from the application of these doctrinal tools providing the adjudicating bodies
with broader discretionary power upon which the survival of the domestic
policy choice will depend. As such, the examination will reveal the extent to
which the horizontal, ideological struggle between trade and non-trade values
is related to the vertical, institutional struggle between the adjudicating bodies
and Members.
Though my primary focus will be the interpretation of necessity under the
GATT, the analysis is equally applicable to the other agreements for three
reasons: ﬁrst, despite the different textual provisions of necessity within and
amongst the agreements, the adjudicating bodies’ interpretation reveals heavy
1 The tests that have received the most attention thus far and will be considered in this dis-
cussion are: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), in WTO, The Legal Texts:
The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (2007) 423–493; (Legal
Texts) arts XX and XXI; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(15 April 1994); Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO (hereinafter WTO Agreement),
Annex 1A, Legal Texts, 59–73, arts 2.2 and 5.6 (hereinafter SPS Agreement); Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (15 April 1994) WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, Legal Texts 121–143,
arts 2.2 and 2.5 (hereinafter TBT Agreement); General Agreement on Trade in Services, WTO
Agreement, Annex 1B, Legal Texts, 284–320, arts XIV and VI:4 (hereinafter GATS Agreement).
2 See for example, S Charnovitz, ‘Environment and Health Under WTO Dispute Settlement’
(1998) 32 Int’l Lawyer 901, 920–21 (highlighting environmentalists’ distrust of the WTO dispute
settlement system); R Howse and E Turk, ‘The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations—A Case
Study of the Canada-EC Asbestos Dispute,’ in G de Burca and J Scott (eds), The EU and the
WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2003) 283; C Button, The Power
to Protect: Trade, Health and Uncertainty in the WTO (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004).
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cross-fertilization, making the examination of one test in isolation nonsensical
if not impossible; secondly, ascertaining what was intended to be the relevant
balance under one agreement is assisted by reference to the balance contained
in the other agreements by way of comparison; ﬁnally, the different balances
struck under each agreement are crucial to determining the broader equilib-
rium embodied by the WTO agreement as a whole.
I will suggest that the meaning of necessity as interpreted by the adjudi-
cating bodies has, until recently, demonstrated increasing divergence from the
language of the treaty text, and needlessly curtailed the domestic regulatory
freedom afforded toMembers under the treaty. Beginning with the importation
of the least restrictive means (here in after LRM) test in US-Section 337,
the GATT and WTO adjudicatory bodies have applied the necessity test to
strike out the legitimate use of a domestic measure if any less trade-restrictive
measure is deemed to be available, regardless of whether the alternative
measure is economically feasible to implement or whether it achieves
the level of protection chosen by the Member. The creation of the balancing
test, ﬁrst enunciated in Korea-Beef 3 and now ﬁrmly entrenched as the proper
methodology an adjudicating body should employ when applying the
necessity test, further tipped the balance in favour of trade liberalization. As
subsequent applications of this test reveal, the balancing test expands the
jurisdiction of the adjudicating bodies, demonstrating a disconcerting de-
pendence on their discretion for the survival of domestic regulatory choices.
The jurisprudence reveals a strong tendency to judge the value of the policy
goal using the adjudicating bodies’ own value system and opaque reasoning
on how the elements of the balancing test interact when applied to the
particular circumstances of the case. Substantial cross-fertilization of the
necessity tests appearing in different agreements has further promoted
the creation of a GATT necessity test at odds with the language of the text.
My primary assertion is that the balancing test does not reﬂect the
balance of rights and obligations reached by the Members. I suggest that the
aim of exposing illegitimate protectionist measures can and should be
achieved through a more textually consistent interpretation of necessity.
Giving proper effect to the content of article XX sub-clauses and chapeau, as
well as the differences between the necessity provisions in different agree-
ments, will provide the necessary scrutiny of Members’ regulations without
illegitimate intervention into regulatory autonomy. Such a test will preserve
the negotiated balance between autonomy and free trade and provide a
more transparent and certain legal standard against which measures
should be assessed. Part II below will address the negotiated balance agreed
upon by the Members with particular regard to the nature of the WTO
agreement and will set out the doctrinal tools often employed in the
3 Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161.169/AB/
R, 11 December 2000.
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interpretation of necessity. Part III will describe and critique the interpretative
evolution of necessity under each agreement by the adjudicating bodies,
focusing on the signiﬁcant developments and degrees of convergence and
difference. The GATT article XX test will be compared to the emerging
jurisprudence on necessity under the GATS, SPS and TBT.4 Part IV will
examine the three limbs of the Korea-Beef test in light of their interpretative
legitimacy under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties5 (VCLT),
propose and examine an alternative test and brieﬂy examine whether LRM
and balancing tests are compatible with the purpose and current structure of
the WTO regime.
II. WTO AND DOMESTIC REGULATORY AUTONOMY
A. WTO Objectives
The preliminary question that needs to be answered is what balance is struck
between competing interests under the WTO agreements. The WTO system
was, of course, intended to develop ‘an integrated, more viable and durable
multilateral trading system’,6 serving the GATT embodied goal of the ‘sub-
stantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade’.7 However, while the
system clearly promotes trade liberalization, it can be said that the WTO’s
core principle is non-discrimination.8 This distinction goes to the very heart of
the debate as the interpretation of ‘necessity’ is informed by the object and
purpose of the treaties.9
In stark contrast to the harmonization/positive integration goals of other
regimes such as the European Union (EU)10 and the United States (US)
4 The newer SPS, TBT and GATS agreements have not yet been subjected to the same degree
of judicial scrutiny as they have only been raised and considered relevant on a limited number of
occasions. As such, the discussion relating to these agreements is similarly constrained. In par-
ticular, while the GATS jurisprudence will be discussed, it will not be considered as a separate
necessity test to the one contained in the GATT due to the almost identical textual content and
similar goals of the agreements (see n 134). Necessity under the TRIPs Agreement will not be
discussed. 5 VCLT 1155 UNTS 331 art 31.
6 WTO Agreement, preamble.
7 Preamble to the GATT, echoed verbatim in WTO Agreement preamble.
8 J O McGinnis and ML Movesian, ‘Commentary: The World Trade Constitution’, (2000) 114
Harv L Review 511, 517.
9 VCLT art 31. This method of interpretation has been accepted by the adjudicating bodies on
a number of occasions which have stated that this provision constitutes ‘customary rules of
interpretation of public international law’ for the purposes of DSU art 3.2. See, for example,
United States-Section 301–310 of the Trade Act 1974, WT/DS 152/R, 22 December 1999, paras
7.21–7.22; United States-Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 16; US- Shrimp/Turtle, WT/DS58/AB/R
(1998) para 34.
10 That is not to suggest that this is exactly what the EU has achieved: See T Mollers, ‘The
Role of Law in European Integration’ (2000) 48 Am J Comp L 679, 683 noting it has achieved
‘islands’ of integration.
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federal system,11 which seek to create uniformity amongst their members
in accordance with supra-nationally imposed standards, the WTO regime
imposes no such requirements.12 Instead, the WTO permits Members to
implement regulatory and legislative regimes freely to promote whatever
public policy objectives they deem to be in their national interests, with only
one restriction: these measures cannot discriminate between imported and
domestically produced goods of the same kind, or between trading partners.13
Non-discrimination has been hailed for its facilitation of regulatory hetero-
geneity by identifying measures without excessive review of domestic policy
choices.14 However, in order to ensure sufﬁcient protection for domestic
measures designed to achieve non-trade goals, the Members included safe-
guards in the form of the article XX general exceptions. Under article XX,
domestic policy choices aimed at protecting certain non-trade values are af-
forded such high importance that Members are permitted to escape their
GATT obligations. Even measures that involve discrimination are acceptable
but only if such discrimination is not arbitrary or unjustiﬁed.15 This limitation
on absolute freedom to regulate illustrates the dual objectives of article XX
and embodies the broader challenge facing the WTO system as a result of its
negative integration character.16 Importantly, it also demonstrates that the
resolution of competing interests in the WTO is the product of political
negotiation.17
It is useful at this point to brieﬂy deﬁne domestic regulatory autonomy since
it is not deﬁned in the WTO agreements. While subject to different inter-
pretations,18 the common understanding appears to be the freedom to pursue
11 Note that Aﬁlalo and Foster also refer to the NAFTA regime as requiring greater integration
than the WTO: A Aﬁlalo and S Foster, ‘The World Trade Organisation’s Anti-Discrimination
Jurisprudence: Free Trade, National Sovereignty, and Environmental Health in the Balance’
(2003) 15 Geo Int’l Envtl L Rev 633, 642–647.
12 A number of exceptions to this general rule have developed including the obligations
imposed under the TRIPS agreement which requires Members to achieve an agreed level of
intellectual property protection within their jurisdictions (TRIPS Part II) while the SPS calls for
SPS measures to be harmonized ‘on as wide a basis as possible’: (see SPS, art 3). Note, however,
even these exceptions do not achieve complete harmonization as they only set minimum
standards.
13 GATT art I (Most-Favoured Nation) and art III (National Treatment).
14 McGinnis and Movesian (n 8) 550.
15 See art XX chapeau: ‘. . . nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures . . .’
16 The difﬁculties posed by the negative integration requirement are examined below. See also
J R Pritchard and J Benedickson, ‘Securing the Canadian Economic Union’, in M. Trebilcock et al
(eds), Federalism and the Canadian Economic Union (1983) (‘[T]he tension between political
autonomy and economic integration is inescapable in any non-unitary political system’) 3.3; cited
in J C Marwell, ‘Trade and Morality: The WTO Public Morals Exceptions after Gambling’ (2006)
81 NYUL Rev 802, 802.
17 N Walker, ‘The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in A New Key’, in G De Burca and
J Scott (eds), The EU and WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues (2003) 47.
18 Olivier Cattaneo notes that the concept of policy space is ‘ambiguous’ and used differently
by different Members in different contexts, often in pursuit of conﬂicting objectives: ‘Has the
WTO Gone Too Far or Not Far Enough? Some Reﬂections on the Concept of Policy Space’ in
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domestic policy choices in accordance with the particular economic, social
and cultural needs and/or preferences of that State.19 Because the precise
content of each term is difﬁcult to discern (as seen by the WTO adjudicating
bodies),20 the manner of their interpretation can inﬂuence the trade/non-trade
debate. For the purposes of this discussion, domestic regulatory autonomy will
be deﬁned as the freedom to pursue these goals, regardless of whether the
value hierarchy accords with international preferences and regardless of its
effect on trade.21
The concern to preserve regulatory autonomy while disciplining protec-
tionist measures has characterized not only the evolution of the GATT but also
the SPS and TBT agreements.22 These latter two agreements were introduced
to the world trade system as a direct response to the growing concern that
internal measures could be and were being used as disguised restrictions on
trade. In an attempt to minimize this practice, these agreements looked past
non-discriminatory external trade barriers, required all measures to be the
least trade-restrictive means available and introduced international standards.
However, in keeping with the continued protection of domestic autonomy,
the Members insisted that the establishment of such standards had to be
negotiated in a manner that minimized the effects of regulatory actions
on international trade without interfering in Members’ responsibilities to
legislate for the protection of their people and environment.23 ‘Necessity’ was
again used as the primary benchmark for testing the legitimacy of these in-
ternal measures.
Though the SPS and TBT agreements24 were negotiated long after
the GATT, the introduction of the concept of a ‘single undertaking’ creating
a single treaty that must now be interpreted as a whole, ensures that the
obligations contained in each agreement inﬂuence those contained in the
others.
A. Mitchell (ed) Challenges and Prospects for the WTO (2005) 58; See generally, R Baldwin,
C Scott, and C Hood (ed) A Reader on Regulation (1998).
19 MM Du, ‘Domestic Regulatory Autonomy under the TBT Agreement: From Non-
Discrimination to Harmonisation’ (2007) 6 Chinese JIL 269, 274.
20 See in particular the difﬁculty faced by the adjudicating bodies in ascertaining what con-
stituted public morals in the US-Gambling decision (Part II B).
21 This deﬁnition adopts Du’s perception of what regulatory autonomy means under the TBT
Agreement (n. 19), however, the deﬁnition appears to ﬁt equally well with what the Member’s
envisage beyond the TBT.
22 G Marceau and J Trachtman, ‘The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, A Map
of the World Trade Organisation Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods’ in G A Bermann and
P C Mavroidis (eds), Trade and Human Health and Safety (2006) 9.
23 Spec (71) 143, 30 September 1971, S III, art I(c) cited in Marceau and Trachtman, ibid 22.
24 See above (n 1).
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B. The Language of Necessity Contained in the GATT, SPS and TBT
Agreements
1. The GATT
As mentioned, the GATT has provided for the pursuit of legitimate govern-
ment policies that operate contrary to the general rules against discriminatory
measures through article XX. Ten legitimate policy exceptions are listed and,
though the list is exhaustive, the wording of each sub-clause is crafted
broadly, giving wide scope for public policy measures to be covered by one of
these exceptions. Of the ten exceptions, only three use the term ‘necessary’.25
The remaining exceptions require the measure to be ‘relating to’,26 ‘imposed
for’,27 ‘undertaken in pursuance of’28 and ‘essential to’.29 Common to all ten,
however, is the ‘linking’ character of each of these terms, that is, they measure
the relationship between the ends sought and the means chosen. Each term
requires a different degree of connection before the measure will legitimately
fall under one of the designated exceptions. The very limited textual restric-
tions placed on domestic regulatory authorities to legislate with regard to these
issues suggest that the negotiators intended for regulatory freedom to be pre-
served as much as possible and, concomitantly, to provide little opportunity
for supranational review.30
Integral to the interpretation of the GATT necessity test but not an element
of its immediate construction is its relationship with the chapeau of article
XX. Referring to the introductory words of article XX, the chapeau prohibits
measures falling within one of the ten exceptions from constituting: (i) arbi-
trary discrimination; (ii) unjustiﬁable discrimination; or (iii) a disguised re-
striction on international trade.31 The purpose of the chapeau is recognized to
be the prevention of the ‘abuse’ of the article XX exceptions by ensuring they
are not ‘so applied to frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the holder of
the right under the substantive rules of the General Agreement’.32 The
Appellate Body (AB) in US-Gasoline33 afﬁrmed the importance of the re-
lationship between the article XX exceptions and the chapeau by proposing a
two-tier test.34 It noted that the contested measure not only needs to fall into
25 GATT art XX (a), (b), (d). It is unclear whether (i) will be considered to refer to ‘necessary
to’ or ‘involving’, the latter being preferred by the US-Gasoline AB, at 17. The sub-clause has not
received any formal consideration and is worded differently from (a), (b) and (d).
26 Sub-paras (c) and (e). 27 Sub-para (f).
28 Sub-para (h). 29 Sub-para ( j).
30 Howse has suggested that the role of the trade insider network led to an ‘amnesia’ regarding
the exact bargain that was struck between ‘freer trade and the welfare state’ and the development
of ‘an ideology of free trade’: R Howse, ‘The Boundaries of the WTO: From Politics to
Technocracy—and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime’ (2002) 96 AJIL 94,
98–99.
31 All three requirements are deemed to ‘impart meaning into each other’ and ‘can be read side
by side’: US-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 April
1996 (US-Gasoline) 25. 32 Emphasis added: ibid 22.
33 ibid. 34 ibid.
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one of the ten exceptions to be regarded as justiﬁed protectionism but also to
satisfy the introductory paragraph.35
Though the ‘contours and content’ of these three standards remain open,36
these requirements have broader implications for the content and scope of the
necessity test, given that a contested measure must satisfy both the exceptions
provisions and the chapeau in order to succeed. The safeguards contained in
the chapeau against the abuse of the exceptions provisions will logically limit
what needs to be considered in the necessity test, especially given the breadth
of the third prohibition.37 However, the extent to which these three standards
are sensitive enough to the particularities of a Member’s regulatory environ-
ment remains unsettled.38
2. The SPS and TBT agreements
The interpretation of the SPS and TBT necessity tests has had a particularly
strong inﬂuence over the development of the application of GATT article XX.
However, there are number of signiﬁcant differences between each test. In
particular, unlike the GATT where the necessity provisions are phrased as
exceptions to Members’ obligations, the SPS and TBT necessity requirements
impose positive obligations, shifting the burden of proof from the defending
State to the complaining State to show the measures were not necessary. The
textual content of each test thus logically differs.
At ﬁrst glance, the agreements appear similar. The SPS preamble echoes the
chapeau of article XX and sub-clause (b), indicating from the outset that the
purpose of the agreement is to achieve a balance between allowing Members
sufﬁcient policy space to regulate with regard to SPS measures while dis-
ciplining protectionist measures. The TBT preamble also contains a very
similar paragraph with an additional paragraph afﬁrming the Members’ desire
to ensure that such regulations do not constitute ‘unnecessary obstacles to
international trade’.39 However, after this point, the language of the necessity
provisions differs from that contained in the GATT.
35 ibid, citing US-Imports of Certain Automotive Assemblies Report adopted 26 May 1982
BISD 30S/107 para 56; Argentina-Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import
of Finished Leather WT/DS155/R, 19 December 2000, paras 11.288–11.289.
36 US-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R,
12 October 1998 (US-Shrimp/Turtle) para 120: After stating that the standards were ‘necessarily
broad in scope and reach’, the AB stated the scope of these three standards ‘will vary as the kind
of measure under examination varies’.
37 TJ Schoenbaum, ‘International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing
Search for Reconciliation’ (1997) 91 AJIL 269. Schoenbaum argues in favour of greater defer-
ence from the adjudicating body to the regulatory autonomy of the State when applying the
exception provisions under art XX as the next logical step is to apply the chapeau: 277.
38 For a fuller exploration of the potential for the chapeau to accommodate non-trade issues see
S Gaines, ‘The WTO’s Reading of the GATT art XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on
Environmental Measures’ (2001) 22 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 739.
39 TBT preamble, paras 5 and 6.
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Article 2.2 of the TBT agreement requires technical regulations to be ‘not
more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulﬁl a legitimate objective’, thus
automatically importing a least-restrictive means test which is not textually
present in article XX. It also includes a non-exhaustive list of legitimate
objectives of similar character to the exceptions contained in the GATT.
Article 2.2 of the SPS requires that the SPS measure is applied ‘only to the
extent necessary to protect human, or plant life or health’ while SPS article 5.6
includes a least restrictive means test similar to the one employed under the
TBT. It requires SPS measures to be ‘not more trade-restrictive than required
to achieve their appropriate level of . . . protection, taking into account tech-
nical and economic feasibility’. The provision is accompanied by a footnote
that adds a further qualiﬁcation to the implementation of the test, that is, the
reasonable availability of the alternative measures.40
The signiﬁcance of these distinctions will be explored in Part II, though
even at this preliminary stage it appears that the balance struck between free
trade and regulatory autonomy under each agreement appears to be slightly
different. Interestingly, the extent to which the jurisprudence has given effect
to these distinctions is open to question.
C. Interpretative Tools and the Horizontal/Vertical Power Struggle
The inextricable relationship between a Member’s choice of measure and
its justiﬁcation makes adjudicating its legitimacy impossible without
some form of intrusion into the decision-making authority of the State.
The issue that remains unresolved is how much interference by the adjudi-
cating bodies should be permitted and in what manner. Not only has the
line been repeatedly drawn, shifted and erased in academic discourse41
(exacerbated by the growing diversity of WTO membership),42 the juris-
prudence has echoed this uncertainty in its application of the necessity
test, reafﬁrming the link between the horizontal trade/non-trade debate and
the vertical institutional struggle between Members and the adjudicating
bodies.
The relatively low level of integration required under the WTO treaty
makes the appropriate delineation of competence all the more difﬁcult to de-
ﬁne. In contrast, the ultimate vision of a uniﬁed community and single market
has provided the EU with a signiﬁcant advantage over the WTO in this regard,
essentially providing the European Court of Justice (ECJ) with the clear
constitutional prerogative to curtail state sovereignty in favour of free trade
and thus the greater economic welfare of all nations within the community.43
40 SPS Agreement, art 5.6, fn 3. 41 McGinnis and Movesian (n 9) 550.
42 See Marwell (n 16) 808–809.
43 Button makes this comment speciﬁcally in relation to health measures adopted by states:
above (n 2) 208–9.
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Even within this highly integrated community, ECJ practice has demonstrated
a deferential tendency, only striking down measures in extreme cases.44 In
addition, in cases where there is a paucity of facts in preliminary rulings, the
Court will leave the ﬁnal decision on the proportionality of the measure to the
national courts.45
This commonality has also helped deﬁne the level of scrutiny in the US
federal structure in instances where state measures have implicated inter-state
commerce. The US Commerce Clause46 has been used by the Supreme Court
to subject the measure to intense scrutiny in order to protect the aims of the
federal structure that embodies the idea that the future of each State is inex-
tricably linked to the fate of the others.47 Unlike the EU and US, the WTO
Members have no common history or common cultural values upon which it
could build a community. Nor, most importantly, is this its goal. As can be
seen, the character of a negative integration treaty such as this one necessarily
implies that in addition to the stated goal of trade liberalization and non-
discrimination, a respect for sovereignty and national deference is also
prominently present.48 Additionally, nothing in the text of the treaty indicates
that national sovereignty should be given lesser weight than the other princi-
ples. In fact, it is this continuing respect for such autonomy that characterises
the WTO as a negative integration treaty.
Contributing to the uncertainty is the fact that a principled legal doctrine on
the standard of review49 in the WTO context has not yet been formulated.50
The treaty text is devoid of any explicit reference to what it should be.51
However, that is not to say that the treaty is completely silent on the matter: as
44 Joanne Scott argues that the ECJ has been more deferential to the political imperatives
driving the introduction of certain measures by the national government: J Scott, ‘On Kith and
Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and the WTO’ in JHHWeiler (ed), The
EU and WTO and the NAFTA, Towards a Common Law of International Trade (2000) 125–68.
cf Button who argues that the ECJ case law shows ‘very little deference’ to Member State
preferences when applying the least trade-restrictive alternative test: ibid 208.
45 J Neumann and E Turk, ‘Necessity Revisited: Proportionality in World Trade Organization
Law after Korea-Beef, EC-Asbestos, and EC-Sardines’ (2003) 37 J World Trade 1 199, 232.
46 Art 1, s 8, clause 3 of the US Constitution states that Congress has the exclusive authority to
manage commerce between the states, with foreign nations and Indian tribes.
47 Button (n 2) 202.
48 Hilf has highlighted eight principles and objectives of the WTO found in prominent
positions in the legal text and acknowledged by the AB.: M Hilf, ‘Power, Rules and
Principles—Which Orientation for WTO/GATT Law?’ (2001) 4 J Int’l Econ L 111.
49 The term ‘standard of review’ in this discussion is used in its most general form to refer to its
inﬂuence over the general allocation of power between the adjudicating bodies and WTO
Members by dictating the extent of power to be awarded to each party on issue of law and fact:
M Andenas and S Zleptnig, ‘Proportionality: WTO Law in Comparative Perspective’ (2007) 42
Tex Int’l L J 371, 395. Consequently, the discussion relating to the application of the ‘necessity’
test will involve reference to both types of review. See also M Oesch, Standards of Review in
WTO Dispute Resolution (OUP, Oxford, 2003) for greater consideration of this issue.
50 Button (n 2) 193.
51 With the exception of art 17.6 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
GATT.
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will be shown, much can be inferred from the particular drafting of certain
provisions, particularly those relating to necessity under the different agree-
ments. However, the clearest pronouncement on the issue to date came from
the AB in EC-Hormones52 where it decided that the general standard of re-
view to be applied to all WTO agreements was simply ‘an objective assess-
ment of the matter’.53 It believed such a standard reﬂects the balance ‘between
jurisdictional competences conceded by the Members to the WTO and the
jurisdictional competences retained by the Members for themselves’.54 The
ambiguity of this standard was little assisted by the AB’s outright rejection of
the two extreme possibilities: de novo and total deference standards.55 The
result has been the application of a different standard of review under each
WTO agreement.56
In light of the above, it is not surprising that the extent to which the
interpretation of necessity has restricted the autonomy of WTO Members
has varied signiﬁcantly. The changes to the test have occurred through the
adjudicating bodies’ use of what Trachtman terms ‘trade-off’ devices, that is,
the doctrinal tools used to balance competing interests.57 Each of these de-
vices infers a different standard of review by informing the vertical allocation
of powers between adjudicator and Member as well as the horizontal conﬂict
between trade liberalization and other policy goals.58 At one end of the scale,
simple means-ends59 rationality tests require little more than a face-value
examination of the State’s regulatory choices in order to determine whether
the measure is directed at the goal the State claims it is. The traditional least-
restrictive means test takes a step beyond the ends-means rationality test and
asks whether the State chose the most trade-efﬁcient option available
to it to achieve its goal.60 Thus, the characterization of the end sought
will often be determinative.61 The reasoning provides more scope for the
adjudicating body to review the measure through the determination of what
measures are reasonably available and whether the purpose can be legiti-
mately pursued.62
Closer to the opposite pole, proportionality, balancing and cost-beneﬁt
analysis are trade-off devices that provide far more opportunity for judicial
52 EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC-Hormones), WT/DS48/AB/R,
16 January 1998, para 116.
53 ibid: The AB based its reasoning on art 11 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Agreement, Annex 2 (DSU).
54 ibid, para 115. 55 ibid, para 117.
56 Andenas and Zleptnig (n 49) 396.
57 Trachtman identiﬁes six broad categories: national treatment, simple means-end rationality
test, necessity or least trade restrictive alternative test, proportionality test, balancing test and
cost-beneﬁt analysis: see JP Trachtman, ‘Trade and . . . Problems, Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis and
Subsidiarity’, available at: http://ejil.org/journal/Vol19/No1/art3.html, 1.
58 ibid 2.
59 Each of these terms should be interpreted in their most general sense.
60 Trachtman (n 57) 3. 61 ibid. 62 ibid.
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intervention into the decision-making processes of States. Making a number
of appearances in the application of the necessity test in recent years,63 pro-
portionality strictu sensu has been termed a ‘European law’ concept64 and
requires an examination of whether the means adopted are proportionate to the
ends sought. In the WTO context, it would mean that the restriction of trade
must not be disproportionate to the beneﬁts arising from the protection of the
value covered by the measure. In this respect, it is largely similar to cost-
beneﬁt analysis but lowers the very high hurdle that analysis imposes by not
necessarily requiring that the beneﬁts outweigh the costs.65 Importantly, it
also requires a comparative analysis of the outcomes of the proportionality test
as applied to alternative measures.66 Thus, this device parallels the elements
of the necessity test but places the value being pursued under scrutiny as well
as the means chosen to achieve it.
Finally, the language of the balancing test has been used frequently in
WTO necessity interpretations.67 On a continuum from least intrusive to most
intrusive into regulatory autonomy, this device can be seen as inferring a
more intrusive standard of review than the one contained in the necessity test
but arguably less intrusive than proportionality strictu sensu and the cost-
beneﬁt analysis. This is because it does not actually attempt to quantify the
competing values but rather ‘recognizes the difﬁculty in formalizing the
analysis’ and instead seeks to balance all the competing values in a less
stringent manner.68 However, again, the test requires an evaluation of the
value being pursued.
The issue of contention thus arising from the use of the latter three devices
when applying the necessity test is whether and to what extent the unelected
and unaccountable adjudicating body can and/or should engage in an exercise
of ‘second-guessing’ the policy choices of popularly elected national gov-
ernments.69 The absence of a clear standard of review has allowed the delin-
eation of competencies to fall, by default, into the hands of the adjudicating
bodies. However, that is not to say the treaty is silent on the issue: as will be
demonstrated, the speciﬁc language chosen to construct each necessity test
under each agreement provides a solid groundwork for the resolution of
this issue. Thus, the fundamental question is whether the scope afforded to
63 Neuman and Turk have concluded that the WTO tribunals have not yet adopted a strict
proportionality test and that the rules of the WTO necessity test do not incorporate any explicit
reference to it: Neuman and Turk, above (n 45) 231. In contrast, Hilf regards it as ‘one of the more
basic principles underlying the multilateral trading system’: Hilf, above (n 48) 6. Desmedt con-
cluded in his analysis that there is no uniform interpretation of the proportionality principle in
WTO law: A Desmedt, ‘Proportionality in WTO Law’ (2001) 4 (3) J Int’l Econ Law 441, avail-
able at http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/4/3/441, 21.
64 M Kennett, J Neuman and E Turk, ‘Second Guessing National Level Policy Choices:
Necessity, Proportionality and Balance in the WTO Services Negotiations’ (2003) CIEL, pre-
sented at the WTO’s 5th Ministerial Meeting in August 2003, available at: http://www.ciel.org/
Publications/Necessity_3Sep03.pdf at 5. 65 Trachtman (n 57) 3.
66 ibid. 67 See Part IIB. 68 Trachtman (n 41) 3.
69 McGinnis and Movesian (n 8) 513.
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domestic autonomy by the adjudicating bodies in both the horizontal and
vertical struggles accords with the level of interference negotiated and agreed
upon by the Members. It is to this issue we now turn.
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE NECESSITY TEST JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Necessity Test Under the GATT Article XX
1. The original test:‘least restrictive means’ and‘reasonable availability’
The term ‘necessary’ was ﬁrst interpreted70 by the GATT Panel inUS- Section
337 of the Tariff Act of 193071 when the US claimed that the measure in
question was necessary under GATT article XX(d) to secure compliance with
domestic patent laws. The US argued that section 337 provided the only
means of enforcement of United States patent rights against imports of pro-
ducts manufactured abroad by means of a process patented in the United
States. Here the Panel stated:
[a] contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT
provision as ‘necessary’ if an alternative measure which it could reasonably be
expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is
available to it.72
The Panel went on to state that in cases where no GATT-consistent measure is
reasonably available, ‘a contracting party is bound to use, among the measures
reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency
with other GATT provisions’.73 In determining whether such alternatives ex-
isted, the Panel cited the existence of other possible measures without regard
to whether these alternatives could achieve the level of protection desired by
the US,74 and despite US arguments that they could not.75 Signiﬁcantly, the
Panel stated that the LRM requirement did not require a change in either the
Member’s chosen level of enforcement or the substance of the law, provided
that the law did not distinguish between domestically produced and imported
goods.76 This suggests that it was aware that its choice of judicial tool could
be seen as an incursion into the regulatory freedom of WTO Members. As the
application of the test showed that this extra-textual obligation requires
Members to assess the alternative only against its relative impact on trade,
70 Although US-Import of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, BISD 30S/107 adopted
26 May 1983, raised the issue, it was never considered by the panel.
71 US- Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, BISD 365/345 adopted 7 November 1989
(US- Section 337).
72 US- Section 337, BISD 365/345, para 5.26; Reafﬁrmed in US-Measures Affecting Alcoholic
and Malt Beverages (US- Malt Beverages) adopted 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/206, para 5.52; and
Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes (Thai-Cigarettes)
adopted 7 November 1990 BISD 37S/200, para 223.
73 US-Section 337, BISD 365/345, para 5.26.
74 ibid para 5.33. 75 ibid para 4.9. 76 ibid para 6.1.
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it is difﬁcult to see how the LRM necessity test could peacefully co-exist
with the Member’s right to choose their level of protection. The issue of
whether a Member’s treaty-based freedom to pursue a legitimate policy goal
could be maintained under the LRM test without contradiction was now
raised.77
This particular application of the LRM test in the Thai-Cigarettes78 case
did little to remedy this concern. In this case, Thailand argued that the
import prohibition it had instituted on tobacco and tobacco products while
simultaneously allowing the sale of domestic cigarettes was necessary ‘to
protect human . . . life or health’ under article XX(b). The Panel noted that
while article XX(b) ‘clearly allowed contracting parties to give priority to
human health over trade liberalization’, and accepted this to be Thailand’s
goal,79 any measures implemented to achieve this goal could only be con-
sidered necessary if ‘there were no alternative measures consistent with
the General Agreement, or less inconsistent with it, which Thailand could
reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health policy objectives’.80
Thus, although US-Section 337 had dealt with the meaning of ‘necessary’
under article XX(d), the Panel in Thai Cigarettes concluded that the term
‘necessary’ had the same meaning under sub-clause (b) and (d).81 The de-
cision suggested that a uniform interpretation was being developed with
regard to necessity under GATT article XX, despite the different values
being pursued under each exception. While this approach ﬁnds support
in the fact that article XX does not purport to place the values being protected
in any hierarchical order, the different wording of the two provisions, as well
as the fact that the objects and values of the ‘laws and regulations’ in sub-
paragraph (d) are undeﬁned while the values contained in (b) are clearly ex-
pressed, may constitute grounds for questioning the appropriateness of this
uniformity.
Following an examination to this effect, the Panel found that alternatives
existed with regard to both of Thailand’s qualitative and quantitative aims.82
Particularly signiﬁcant was the Panel’s acceptance of the US-proposed
alternative to reduce demand: a ban on the advertisement of both domestic and
foreign cigarettes, despite Thailand’s arguments and evidence suggesting that
77 See generally, D Regan, ‘The Meaning of “Necessary” in GATT Article XX and GATS
Article XIV: The Myth of Cost-Beneﬁt Balancing’ (2007) 6 World Trade Review 3 347, 348,
whose analyses this issue with regard to the balancing test applied in Korea-Beef, 348.
78 Thai-Cigarettes DS10/R- 37S/200, adopted on 7 November 1990.
79 ibid para 76. 80 ibid para 75.
81 The Panel concluded, ‘In both paragraphs the same term was used and the same objective
intended: to allow contracting parties to impose trade restrictive measures inconsistent with the
General Agreement to pursue overriding public policy goals to the extent that such incon-
sistencies were unavoidable. The fact that paragraph (d) applies to inconsistencies resulting from
the enforcement of GATT-consistent laws and regulations while paragraph (b) applies to those
resulting from health-related policies therefore did not justify a different interpretation of the term
“necessary”’: Thai-Cigarettes DS10/R- 37S/200, para 74.
82 ibid paras 77–81.
102 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589309990091
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 07:26:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
such measures were ineffective to achieve its stated aims.83 Further, no con-
sideration was given to whether these alternatives were feasible with regard to
Thailand’s particular social, political and economic conditions.
The effect of the application of the LRM necessity test in this manner has
two points of signiﬁcance for the balance of domestic regulatory autonomy
against free trade. First, as also seen in the US-Section 337 Panel decision, the
Thai-Cigarettes Panel indirectly engaged in judging the value of the policy
goal and undermined the Member’s right to choose its own level of protection
by deciding in favour of the alternatives without enquiring into their ability to
achieve Thailand’s stated goals. The implication of this reasoning is to limit a
Member’s freedom to pursue non-trade goals if they negatively affect trade to
a degree which is determined to be unacceptable by a Panel. Secondly, and
related to the ﬁrst issue, the Panel’s decision has fallen subject to intense
criticism for its insensitivity to the practical regulatory experience of gov-
ernments.84 Importantly, the decision reveals an absence of any substantive
consideration of the term ‘reasonably available’ and how it should be applied.
All that was required to defeat the claim of necessity was the existence of a
hypothetically available alternative. Thus, the application of the LRM test
raises a number of concerns relating not only to the appropriateness but also
the competence of the adjudicating bodies to assess the feasibility of regulat-
ory alternatives over the decision made by a Member’s government that pos-
sesses a greater understanding and knowledge of the internal particularities of
the State.85
The question of reasonable availability was given similar treatment in
US-Gasoline.86 Again, the Panel found that reasonable alternatives existed,
despite the US’s claims and evidence that such alternatives would be less
effective, ineffective or unfeasible.87 Of particular interest is the Panel’s
ﬁnding that the determination of the gasoline’s origin (an issue of particular
concern to the US) ‘would often be feasible’,88 thereby implicitly lowering the
higher level of protection the US had sought to achieve. Finally, the Panel
83 Thailand relied on the World Health Organisation’s ﬁndings that advertising bans were
circumvented by multinational tobacco companies through indirect advertising and other modern
marketing techniques, ibid, paras 27 (Thailand’s submissions), para 55 (WHO submissions).
84 D Osiro, ‘GATT/WTO Necessity Analysis: Evolutionary Interpretation and its Impact on
the Autonomy of Domestic Regulation’ (2002) 29 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 2, 123,
127–8; M J Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (3rd edn, 2005)
518; Neumann and Turk (n 45) 208.
85 Button (n 2) 30. See generally, C Correa, ‘Implementing National Public Health Policies in
the Framework of the WTO Agreements’ (2000) 34 J World Trade 5, 89.
86 US-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R, 29 January 1996
(US-Gasoline).
87 See for example, the US argument regarding the difﬁculty of exercising enforcement jur-
isdiction with respect to a foreign reﬁnery, the ‘impossibility of determining the reﬁnery origin
for each imported shipment’, and the recognition of the fact that not all reﬁneries were able to
produce the evidence required to establish an individual baseline: US-Gasoline WT/DS2/R,
para 6.23. 88 ibid para 6.36 (emphasis added).
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stated that an alternative measure did not cease to be reasonably available
simply by virtue of administrative difﬁculties.89 Thus, while the term ‘rea-
sonably available’ may appear, on its face, to provide greater scope for
accommodating the particular social and economic demands of each state, its
interpretation by the Panel in this case nulliﬁed this potential.
2. Textual consistency of the‘least restrictive means’
The application of the test in this way also shows that two possible versions of
the LRM test exist: ﬁrst, a strict analysis where the measure is deemed invalid
only if the available alternatives achieve exactly the same beneﬁts at a lower
cost to free trade; and secondly, a more lax test under which the adjudicating
body may sacriﬁce some beneﬁts provided by the contested measure in order
to implement the alternative ‘where those beneﬁts are judged by the court
to be of less value than the cost–avoidance achieved by the change’.90 By
favouring the latter option, the necessity test began to closely resemble a
cost-beneﬁt analysis under which the adjudicating bodies inserted their own
value judgments with little deference afforded to the factual ﬁndings of the
defending states. This is especially so, as seen in both the Thai-Cigarettes and
US-Gasoline decisions, where the adjudicating bodies dismissed the argu-
ments of the responding Member as to whether the alternatives were
‘reasonably available’.
When compared with the text of article XX and the object of the GATT as a
whole, this line of cases illustrates that the LRM test was used to tilt the
balance in favour of trade liberalization beyond that provided in the treaty.
The text of each necessity exception requires the proposed measure to be
‘necessary to’ achieve a stated goal. Despite afﬁrming that the adjudicating
body’s task is to ‘address whether the inconsistent measure was necessary to
achieve the policy goal sought’,91 in practice, it has been used to refer to the
justiﬁable extent of inconsistency between the regulation and the obligations
under the treaty instead of the measure’s relationship with fulﬁlling the goal
being sought. As Schoenbaum has noted, ‘necessary no longer relates to the
protection of living things, but to whether or not the measure is a “necessary”
departure from the trade agreement.’92 Though his criticism was directed to
89 ibid para 6.28. The Panel’s ﬁnding relating to its application of the necessity test under arts
XX (b) and (d) were not appealed so the issue did not receive fuller treatment.
90 Regan makes this distinction, calling the latter test the ‘loose LRA (least-restrictive
alternative) test’ and notes that the existence of alternatives that achieve all the same beneﬁts as
the contested measure are rare: Regan, ‘Judicial Review of Member-State Regulation of Trade
within a Federal or Quasi-Federal System: Protectionism and Balancing, Da Capo’ (2001) 99
Mich L Rev 1853, 1899–1900; See also Sykes for the argument that the LRM test is being applied
as a form of ‘crude cost-beneﬁt analysis’: A Sykes, ‘The Least Restrictive Means’ (2003) 70 U
Chi L Rev 403. 91 US-Gasoline WT/DS2/R, para 6.22.
92 Schoenbaum, above (n 37) 276. See also R J McLaughlin, ‘Sovereignty, Utility and
Fairness: Using US Takings Law to Guide the Evolving Utilitarian Balancing Approach to Global
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the interpretation of article XX(b), his comments can be extended to all three
of the article XX exceptions referring to necessity. The distinction is further
supported by the construction of the necessity tests in the texts of the TBT and
SPS which clearly provide for the introduction of some LRM analysis, high-
lighting its absence in the text of the GATT.93
In further support for this view, Schoenbaum argues that this new in-
terpretation amounts to an odd distinction between those provisions using the
words ‘necessary to’ and the remaining sub-clauses.94 He states that to allow
the interpretation of necessity to include the LRM test applied by the adjudi-
cating bodies results in a higher threshold for the survival of measures reg-
ulating the protection of human life and health than those ‘undertaken in
pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity agree-
ment’.95 However, it appears that this criticism does not take account of the
fact that the text of the treaty appears to make precisely this distinction by
requiring measures purporting to regulate health and public morals to be
‘necessary’ rather than simply ‘relating to’, ‘involving’ or ‘imposed for’
which all plainly require less of a connection between the measure and the
goal than the term ‘necessary’. While the reasons for this drafting distinction
are not clear, it may be that the drafters foresaw the potential abuse of these
provisions given the political sensitivity and malleable character of these
goals in particular and thus sought to restrict their use to instances where this
higher threshold could be satisﬁed. The distinction further highlights the need
for the interpretation of necessity to give effect to these complex considera-
tions and shows that balancing the competing objectives under the GATT is
no simple task.
Attention must also be paid to the function of the necessity test within the
agreement as a whole. The LRM test as applied by the adjudicating bodies
appears to ignore the character of the article XX sub-clauses as exceptions to
the obligations contained in the agreement. The extent to which such measures
are inconsistent with the GATT should thus be irrelevant. Further, the
introduction of the concept of ‘less-GATT inconsistent’ measures is curious
in itself, not only because it is difﬁcult to see how this can be measured,96
but also because the meaning of the word does not provide space for
shading.97
This interpretation has important ramiﬁcations for the continued relevance
of the chapeau, which is speciﬁcally worded to examine the extent to which
the discriminatory effects are justiﬁable, thus also contradicting the two-step
Environmental Disputes in the WTO’ (1999) 78(4) Oregon Law Review 855, 889 where he argues
that Panels had traditionally relied on ‘strained textual and functional deﬁnitions to prevent
article XX exemptions from being applied’. 93 See Part IIB below.
94 Schoenbaum (n 37) 276. 95 GATT art XX(h).
96 An issue that has not been given any attention by the adjudicating bodies.
97 Camilleri also notes this latter point: V Camilleri, ‘An Analysis of the Necessity Tests as
Applied by the WTO adjudicator’ (LLM Dissertation, College of Europe University, 2004) 9.
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analysis provided for by the AB in US-Gasoline.98 By failing to give effect to
all the terms of the treaty, the application of this particular LRM test appears
to violate VCLT article 31,99 as interpreted by the Appellate Body itself.100
B. Reform: The‘Weighing and Balancing’ of Necessity
The Appellate Body’s decision in Korea-Beef 101 has been generally re-
cognized as marking the beginning of a new interpretation of the meaning of
necessity and its application under article XX through the introduction of a
cost-beneﬁt balancing test.102 The test was further reﬁned and reinforced in
EC-Asbestos.103 However, the extent to which the Korea-Beef balancing test
(hereinafter Korea-Beef test) actually changed the nature of the existing LRM
test or simply conﬁrmed and reﬁned the content of the weighing process im-
plicitly present in the application of that test is open to question. Either way,
the test has had broad ramiﬁcations for the trade/non-trade debate by affording
greater power to the adjudicating bodies to balance the effects of the regulat-
ory goal.
1. The new‘necessary’ under the GATT
In Korea-Beef, Korea unsuccessfully claimed that its dual retail system
segregating imported and domestic produced beef was justiﬁed under
article XX(d), alleging that such differential treatment was necessary to
protect consumers against fraudulent practices prohibited under its Unfair
Competition Act.104 After accepting that Korea’s measures were covered by
the policy objectives envisaged in article XX(d), the AB began its application
of the necessity test. First, the AB noted that ‘necessary’ does not always mean
‘indispensable’ or ‘inevitable’ but refers instead to ‘a range of degrees of
necessity’.105 While one extreme of the continuum deﬁnes necessity as
‘making a contribution to’, the AB stressed that a necessary measure in the
context of the GATT is ‘located signiﬁcantly closer to the pole of indispens-
able’.106 In this respect, the AB appeared to be paying closer attention to the
textual provisions of the treaty and giving full effect to the distinctions of each
sub-clause.
98 See discussion of chapeau (n 34) and surrounding text.
99 Schoenbaum (n 37) 277. 100 US-Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 23.
101 Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161.169/AB/
R, 11 December 2000, (Korea-Beef ).
102 Note, however, Regan’s argument that this is a misunderstanding of what the test actually
entails: Regan (n 77).
103 EC-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R,
12 March 2001, (EC-Asbestos).
104 It alleged that such differential treatment was necessary to protect consumers against
fraudulent practices prohibited under its Unfair Competition Act.
105 Korea-Beef, WT/DS161.169/AB/R, para 161. 106 ibid.
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In some respects, the AB appeared to continue this trend, relying heavily on
the context of sub-clause (d) to assert that, as it was ‘susceptible to being
applied in respect of a wide variety of laws and regulations,’ a treaty inter-
preter ‘may, in appropriate cases, take into account the relative importance of
the common interests or values that the law or regulation to be enforced is
intended to protect.’107
Thus, the AB reasoned that a ﬁnding of necessity under article XX(d)
required ‘a process of weighing and balancing’ at least three factors:
. . .which prominently include the contribution made by the compliance measure
to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the
common interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and the
accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports.108
In implementing this balancing test, the AB noted, ‘[t]he more vital or im-
portant those common interests or values are’ and the greater its contribution,
‘the more easily the measure might be considered “necessary”’.109 Finally, a
measure with a ‘relatively slight impact upon imported products might more
easily be considered “necessary” than a measure with intense or broader
restrictive effects.’110 Importantly, the AB’s wording leaves open the list
of factors that can potentially be taken into account when engaging in the
balancing process but does not provide any guidance on how these factors
interact.
Though many issues regarding the test’s application were unclear, it ap-
pears that examination of the measure in question is, at ﬁrst, self-contained:
that is, the weighing and balancing proceeds without reference to the relative
trade restrictiveness of alternative measures.111 If, following the application of
this process, the contested measure can prove itself to be reasonably effective
in protecting an important interest with moderate trade restrictions, all
alternative measures involving less GATT-inconsistent restrictions will be
considered not ‘reasonably available’ automatically.112 However, if weighing
the contested measure does not produce this outcome, the next step will be to
examine the availability of alternative measures in relative terms to the con-
tested measure.113 Thus, a distinction was made between indispensable and
dispensable measures. The problem of course with maintaining this apparent
bifurcation in practice is that it is difﬁcult to conceive of any situation where a
contested measure that imposes trade restrictions to any degree will be
deemed ‘necessary’ without entering into a consideration of whether reason-
able less-trade restrictive alternatives exist.
With regard to the issue of reasonable availability, the AB implicitly
adopted the Panel’s statement that the onus was on the responding state to
107 ibid para 162. 108 ibid para 164. 109 ibid para 163.
110 ibid. 111 Neumann and Turk (n 45) 211.
112 ibid. 113 Korea-Beef, WT/DS161.169/AB/R, para 173.
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show that the alternatives were not reasonably available or ‘unreasonably
burdensome’ in an economic or technical sense, ‘taking into account a variety
of factors including the domestic costs of such alternative[s]’.114 However, no
indication was given as to how this would be judged, and what degree of
deference (if any) would be given to a Member’s assessment of its own cir-
cumstances. The AB’s decision that Korea could achieve its desired goal using
WTO-consistent measures ‘if Korea would devote more resources to its en-
forcement efforts on the beef sector’,115 despite Korea’s claims that sufﬁcient
resources were not available, highlight the signiﬁcance of these questions for
the protection of Members’ regulatory choices. It also raises concern about the
adjudicating bodies’ competence to make such a determination with limited
knowledge of the particularities of each Member’s economy.
The AB’s recognition of Korea’s autonomy over its chosen level of pro-
tection was also called into question. Contrary to Korea’s claims, the AB
decided that Korea had not in fact intended to totally eliminate fraud but rather
wished only to ‘reduce [the opportunity for fraud] considerably’.116 It arrived
at this conclusion solely on the basis that the total elimination of fraud would
‘probably require a total ban of imports’.117 As a consequence of this ﬁnding,
the alternatives to be considered only had to meet this lower level of protec-
tion inferred by the AB.
The AB concluded that Korea had failed to show that GATT-consistent
alternative measures were not reasonably available to it and thus the measure
failed under article XX(d). Signiﬁcantly, despite setting out the balancing test,
the AB did not engage in applying the test to the facts of the case.118 Its
conclusion appears to suggest that survival of a contested measure under the
LRM test as it was previously applied was still the main benchmark, thought
now (at least theoretically) supplemented with a proportionality test if not a
cost-beneﬁt analysis. The main distinction was that the value of the goal
pursued was expressly called into question.
The EC-Asbestos AB contributed signiﬁcantly to the development of this
new necessity testthrough the special attention paid to the concept of
‘reasonably available’. The appeal involved an examination of whether a
French ban on the manufacturing, sale and import of asbestos ﬁbres in-
troduced to protect human life and health was ‘necessary’ under article XX(b).
No justiﬁcation was given for the transfer of the necessity test under
article XX(d) to (b).119 First, it removed the untenable bifurcation and
114 ibid. 115 ibid para 180.
116 ibid para 178. 117 ibid.
118 The Panel, however, did speciﬁcally state that the dual retail system was ‘a dispro-
portionate measure not necessary to secure compliance with the Korean law against deceptive
practices’: Panel Report para 675.
119 The AB merely stated that the necessity test formulated in section 337 as modiﬁed
by Korea-Beef was correctly applied to the case by the Panel: EC-Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R,
paras 78–79. It is interesting to note that that AB was not obliged engage with the art XX analysis
as it decided against the Panel’s ﬁndings that the art III:4 had been violated. Neumann and Turk
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afﬁrmed the Korea-Beef test as an integral part of the determination of
whether the policy goal could be achieved by a reasonably available less
trade-restrictive alternative.120 This approach was conﬁrmed again in the most
recent application of the test: Brazil-Tyres.121 Here the AB stated that even if a
consideration of the relevant factors produces a preliminary conclusion that
the measure is necessary, ‘this must be conﬁrmed by comparing the measure
with its possible alternatives.’122
The second point of clariﬁcation by the EC-Asbestos AB was that reason-
ableness now meant that a measure with less impact on trade could not be
considered a reasonable alternative if it could not achieve the same degree of
protection sought,123 thereby reducing the impact of the ‘trade trumps’
ideology displayed in the preceding cases. The AB reafﬁrmed that every
Member had an ‘undisputed right to choose the level of protection they con-
sider appropriate in a given situation’.124 Arguably, the extent of deference
afforded to the regulatory autonomy of the State by this AB was greater than
that afforded to Korea as the AB held that a State is not bound to automatically
follow the prevailing majority scientiﬁc opinion when drafting its health pol-
icy.125 Further, the AB accepted that France had chosen to ‘halt’ the spread of
asbestos-related health risks by structuring the measure to eliminate it com-
pletely,126 despite the existence of a number of small exceptions to the ban.
The AB used the level of protection chosen by France as its primary bench-
mark for determining whether Canada’s suggested alternatives were reason-
ably available.127 If the logic of the AB in Korea-Beef is applied to this factual
scenario, the regulatory exceptions could have been used by the AB to negate
the argument that France sought to totally eliminate asbestos products but had
instead sought only to reduce it considerably.128 The difference between
ﬁndings in the two cases highlights the extent to which the preservation of
domestic regulatory autonomy lies in the discretionary hands of the adjudi-
cating bodies under the Korea-Beef test.
Finally, the AB declined to address the issue of whether administrative
difﬁculties in the implementation of the measure would impede it from being
considered reasonably available, thus leaving open the question of how ‘dif-
ﬁculty’ will be assessed.129
However, the decision did not clarify how the elements of the balancing
test would interact. In applying the test the AB did not refer to the
have interpreted the AB’s decision to continue with the art XX analysis as a reﬂection of the AB’s
eagerness to ‘make judicial policy’: Neumann and Turk (n 45) 213.
120 EC-Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, para 172.
121 Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, 3 December
2007. 122 ibid para 156.
123 EC-Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, para 174. 124 ibid para 168.
125 ibid para 178. 126 ibid paras 172–4.
127 ibid para 174. 128 See (n 115) and surrounding text.
129 ibid; EC-Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, para 169.
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trade-restrictiveness of the measure at all and the two remaining elements
were looked at in isolation without reference to how they affected each
other.130 It found the measure to be effective in meeting the desired goal by
reference to the fact that it was a total ban and referred only to importance of
the value, stating:
In this case, the objective pursued by the measure is the preservation of human
life and health through the elimination, or reduction, of the well-known, and life-
threatening, health risks posed by asbestos ﬁbres. The value pursued is both vital
and important in the highest degree. The remaining question, then, is whether
there is an alternative measure that would achieve the same end and that is less
restrictive of trade than a prohibition.131
It appears, then, that the ‘necessity’ of a measure under the GATT is found by
default after consideration of the alternatives. Further, while this statement did
reinforce the fact that the weighing and balancing test would not involve
balancing the level of protection against the trade restriction132 (as appeared in
the earlier applications of the LRM test), it highlighted the extent to which the
importance of the value being sought would dictate the survival of the
measure. The facts of this case were such that each variable sat at the highest
extreme of each continuum: that is, the value was universally held to be of the
utmost importance, the measure was fully effective and the trade-restrictive-
ness was absolute. This raises the question of how consistent and acceptable
the new test would be when applied to a situation where the importance of the
value is not as commonly accepted and the remaining variables are not such
absolutes. The failure of the measure in Korea-Beef provides a useful com-
parison as the measure’s efﬁcacy was reasonable, it was not totally trade-
restrictive and the value (though not stated explicitly by the AB) can safely be
argued to be of relatively less importance than the protection of human health.
When presented with this set of factors, the AB found that it could not justify
the trade-restrictiveness of the measure.
The difﬁculties presented by this ‘value-judging’ aspect of the Korea-Beef
test for the preservation of domestic regulatory autonomy are more clearly
illustrated in the US-Gambling decision.133 In this case, the US’s defence was
based on the public morals exception in GATS article XIV(a), which bears
substantial resemblance to GATT article XX(a).134 As such, the US-Gambling
130 The US-Gambling shows a remarkably similar treatment of the three elements: para 6.494.
131 ibid. 132 Neumann and Turk (n 45) 213.
133 The GATS contains three different provisions incorporating a necessity test of differing
construction: See GATS arts XIV and XIV bis. ArtVI:4 imposes an indirect necessity test on
Members. However, only XIV has been subject to judicial attention thus far.
134 US-Gambling, WT/DS285/R, paras 3.211, 6.511. The only differences are: ﬁrst, that GATS
art XIV(a) refers to not only the GATT XX(a) exception ‘to protect public morals’ but adds ‘or to
maintain public order’; and second, the provision ‘necessary to secure compliance with law or
regulations’ includes a slightly different list of goals: art XIV(c). As such, it is safe to say that the
differences regarding the necessity provisions are minimal.
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Panel believed that the transfer of the test to the GATS would be appropriate
after also noting the common purposes between the GATS and GATT pro-
visions.135 The decision thus also has implications for the future application of
the article XX(a) exception.
The Panel proceeded to determine whether the measure was designed to
protect public morals. In doing so, the Panel took three important steps in its
reasoning: ﬁrst it stated that the concepts of public morals and public order
were highly ﬂexible and varied ‘in time and space, depending on a range of
factors including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious values’.136
Secondly, it acknowledged each State’s right to choose the level of protection
they considered appropriate for that value.137 Finally, however, it refrained
from completely deferring the content of ‘public morals’ to Members,
reasoning that while ‘Members should be given some scope to deﬁne and
apply for themselves the concepts of “public morals” and “public order” in
their respective territories, according to their own systems and scales of va-
lues’,138 the Panel still retained the responsibility of giving meaning to these
terms in order to apply them to the facts.139 Interestingly and perhaps illogi-
cally, rather than relying on US domestic practices, the Panel proceeded to
refer to the practices of other jurisdictions linking gambling issues with mor-
ality as evidence that gambling was indeed an issue of public morality.140 The
Panel’s reasoning contrasts sharply with the Panel’s ﬁnding in Dominican-
Cigarettes141 where it stated it ‘ﬁnds no reason’ to question the Dominican
Republic’s assertion that the collection of tax revenue and prevention of
tax evasion is ‘a most important interest for any country and particularly
for a developing country’.142 No explanation was given as to how the Panel
arrived at this evaluation, illustrating a disconcerting lack of transparency in
its decisions.
The US-Gambling Panel’s reasoning was upheld by the AB, indicating that
Members cannot unilaterally deﬁne public morals, potentially leading to the
exclusion of certain measures that do not ﬁnd international resonance despite
their importance in the culture of the responding State.143 The AB stated that
the standard for the determination of necessity is an objective one. On the one
hand, it stated that panels did have recourse to:
A Member’s characterization of a measure’s objectives and of the effectiveness
of its regulatory approach—as evidenced, for example, by texts of statutes,
135 ibid para 6.448. 136 ibid para 6.461.
137 ibid. This concept is reminiscent of SPS art 5.6: see (n 149) and surrounding text below.
138 ibid (emphasis added). 139 ibid.
140 ibid paras 6.471–4.
141 Dominican Republic-Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes,
WT/DS302/R, 26 November 2004 (Dominican-Cigarettes). The Dominican Republic claimed its
tax stamp requirement for cigarette packets was ‘necessary’ to ensure compliance with tax and
anti-cigarette smuggling laws. 142 ibid para 7.215.
143 Marwell (n 16) 817–19.
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legislative history, and pronouncements of government agencies or of-
ﬁcials . . . 144
However, it went on to state that these characterizations were not binding on
the Panel without elaborating on the extent to which Members’ assessments
would be relevant or the standard of review that would be applied.145 The
signiﬁcance of this issue was further highlighted when the AB asserted that the
results of a comparison between the challenged measure and possible alter-
natives should be considered in light of the importance of the interests at
issue.146 The statement reinforces not only the extent to which the DBS’s
interpretation of the evidence on the value of the goal will dictate its survival
when weighed against the other elements, making the balancing test look far
more like a proportionality test strictu sensu, but also highlights the extent of
adjudicating body discretion in determining whether the measure will even be
considered to fall under one of the exceptions. The dangers posed to the
preservation of regulatory autonomy as articulated in the GATT treaty are
even greater in light of the continuing uncertainty regarding how each variable
relates to the other and the fact that the actual balancing process is difﬁcult to
discern from each adjudicating body’s reasoning.147
2. The inﬂuence of the SPS and TBT agreements
It is critical at this point to refer to the inﬂuence of the SPS and TBT necessity
tests on development of the GATT balancing test. Despite the fact that the
language of the tests under both these agreements provides for a LRM
analysis, it appears that the adjudicating bodies have used them as guidance
for introducing and clarifying aspects of the GATT balancing test largely in
favour of domestic autonomy.
a) SPS agreement
It is useful to recall that the presumption under the SPS agreement is that a
measure is necessary unless and until proven otherwise through the appli-
cation of the LRM test contained in article 5.6.148 This article, when read with
its accompanying footnote, speciﬁes that any proposed alternative measure
144 US-Gambling, WT/DS285/AB/R, 7 April 2005, para 304.
145 ibid. 146 ibid para 307.
147 Marwell notes that the balancing process by the Panel was opaque: (n 16) 813.
148 Though art 5.6 does not explicitly refer to the word ‘necessary’, it has been accepted to
constitute a ‘necessity test’: see, for example, its general treatment in Australia-Measures
Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/R, 12 June 1998, (Australia-Salmon) and Marceau
and Trachtman (n 22), (n 29). Arts 2.3 and 5.5 are also highly relevant to the interpretation of art
5.6. Art 2.2 has not received any judicial consideration to date that focuses simply on whether the
measure was ‘necessary’ but only looks at whether the measure was based on scientiﬁc evidence:
Australia-Salmon, para 8.99.
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must: (1) ‘achieve the appropriate level of. . .protection’, (2) be ‘signiﬁcantly
less restrictive to trade’ and (3) be technically and economically feasible’.149
The AB in Australia-Salmon afﬁrmed that the three elements are ‘cumulative’
and if any one of the three is not met, the contested measure would be deemed
inconsistent with article 5.6.150 The SPS necessity test differs from its GATT
and TBT cousins by explicitly removing the level of protection chosen from
the ambit of judicial review. This is done by referring to the Member’s ‘ap-
propriate level of protection’ deﬁned in Annex A of the agreement to mean
‘the level of protection deemed appropriate by the Member’.151 Coupled with
the establishment of a higher threshold for what will be considered reasonably
available (through the use of footnote 3 and the requirement that the alterna-
tive be ‘signiﬁcantly’ less restrictive), the SPS necessity test at least on its face
appears to increase the likelihood of the contested measure’s survival and
vests the balance of power in the hands of the responding State.
However, the drafting of the SPS necessity agreement does not ﬁrmly de-
lineate the lines of judicial review and domestic autonomy. There is still scope
for an interventionist panel to retract the apparent deferential line through a
number of avenues including its determination of what degree of restrictive-
ness is ‘signiﬁcantly less restrictive’,152 the manner in which they assess
whether an alternative measure will achieve a country’s chosen level of pro-
tection,153 and how the country’s chosen ‘appropriate level of protection’ is to
be discerned.154 The limited jurisprudence on these issues has been echoed in
subsequent GATT jurisprudence on necessity.
Regarding the determination of the State’s chosen level of protection, the
AB ruling in Australia-Salmon appears to tip the vertical power struggle in
favour of Members.155 It rejected the Panel’s assertion that it could substitute
its own reasoning about the implied level of protection,156 ﬁnding instead that
the adjudicating body had to accept the Member’s expressed level of protec-
tion without regard to the level actually achieved by its chosen measure.157
149 SPS Agreement, art 5.6, fn 3 (emphasis added).
150 Australia-Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, 20 October 1998, para 199. This case involved
Australia’s import ban on uncooked salmon intended to keep ﬁsh diseases out of Australia.
151 SPS Agreement Annex A, para 5. See also SPS arts 5.3 and 5.4.
152 No consideration has been given to the meaning of this element. While Japan-Measures
Affecting the Importation of Apples WT/DS245/R, 15 July 2003 (Japan-Apples) and Japan-
Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/R, 22 October 1998, examined and applied
art 2.2, they did not rule on the issue of necessity but rather whether the measure was based on
scientiﬁc evidence (though note that in Japan-Apples the Panel stated that the absence of scientiﬁc
evidence made the measure ‘disproportionate” to the risk: para 8.179).
153 Button (n 2) 71.
154 Case law has shown ‘zero risk’ to be an appropriate level if Members so wish: J Pauwelyn,
‘The WTO Agreement on SPS Measure as Applied in the First Three SPS Disputes’ (1999) JIEL
641, 646.
155 Interestingly, this was held to be so without any consideration for the impact of art 5.4
requesting (not requiring) Members to take into account the objective of minimizing negative
trade effects. 156 Australia-Salmon, WT/DS18/R, para 8.172.
157 Australia-Salmon WT/DS18/AB/R, para 199.
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The only caveat was that the level had to be formulated with sufﬁcient pre-
cision.158 If not, the Panel could infer the appropriate level from that actually
achieved by the measure.159 This reasoning appeared to take hold in GATT
jurisprudence following EC-Asbestos, as seen in the above analysis, and
contrasts sharply with the inferred level of protection in Korea-Beef and Thai-
Cigarettes.160 It should be recalled that article XX is silent on this issue.
Further, the SPS jurisprudence has clariﬁed that a complaining party must
suggest a speciﬁc alternative if it is to establish a prima facie case of incon-
sistency with article 5.6.161 This limitation can be contrasted with earlier ap-
plications of the GATT necessity analysis such as the US-Gambling Panel162
where the Panel took an active role in suggesting alternatives not proposed by
the complaining Member, raising issues about the Panel ‘making the case’ for
that Member.163 The extent to which this could threaten domestic autonomy
was seen particularly clearly in the latter case where the Panel found that the
US had not ‘explored and exhausted reasonably available WTO-consistent
alternatives’ to the prohibition because it had rejected ‘Antigua’s invitation to
engage in bilateral or multilateral consultations and/or negotiations . . . which
could have been used to explore the possibility of ﬁnding . . .. an alterna-
tive’.164 The extent to which this alternative was consistent with a Member’s
right to choose its own level of protection is highly questionable as the process
of negotiation logically includes a certain expectation of compromise. Further,
the mere possibility of hypothetically available alternatives that may or may
not have been suggested during negotiations was deemed sufﬁcient to defeat
the measure. Thus, the Panel’s reasoning appears to show greater elements of
a cost-beneﬁt analysis as seen earlier in the Thai-Cigarettes case rather than
the balancing test as reﬁned in EC-Asbestos where the AB asserted that the
weighing and balancing test would not involve balancing the level of protec-
tion against the trade restriction.165 However, the AB’s rejection of the Panel’s
reasoning166 coupled with its more recent treatment in Brazil-Tyres167
suggests that the SPS jurisprudential approach is now also being applied under
the GATT.168
158 ibid para 207. 159 ibid.
160 Note that the Panel never engaged in ascertaining the precise level of protection sought by
Thailand. It simply examined alternatives believed to reduce the quantity and ensure the quality of
cigarettes generally rather than to any particular extent.
161 Japan-Varietals, WT/DS/76/AB/R paras 126 and 130.
162 US-Gambling, WT/DS285/R, 6.531.
163 Japan-Varietals, WT/DS/76/AB/R, 129.
164 US-Gambling, WT/DS285/R, 6.531.
165 See (n 123) and surrounding text above.
166 US-Gambling AB expressly condemned the Panel’s action in this regard: WT/DS285/AB/
R, para 320. 167 Brazil-Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R para 156.
168 cf Canada-Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, WT/DS276/R, 6 April 2004, para 6.308
where the Panel suggested its own alternative (though note that this case occurred before both
US-Gambling and Brazil-Tyres).
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A ﬁnal area in which the SPS necessity test has shaped GATT necessity
jurisprudence is seen in the attention paid to the footnote to article 5.6 which
requires alternatives to be considered with regard to their ‘technical and
economic feasibility’.169 While concern has been expressed that these pro-
visions ‘invite the Panel to engage in issues of domestic resource allocation
and the structure of a Member’s regulatory administration’,170 its limited ap-
plication indicates that it has not been used for such intrusion. Instead, it has
been used to assess the true viability of proposed alternatives in the particular
Member’s circumstances. The special attention paid to this standard by the
Brazil-Tyres AB is the most recent example of the adjudicating bodies’ rec-
ognition of the regulatory and situational heterogeneity of WTO members,171
and again, sits in contrast with the adjudicating bodies’ decisions in Thai-
Cigarettes and Korea-Beef. Thus, it is clear the SPS necessity provisions
helped shape the interpretation and application of necessity under the GATT
in favour of deferring to domestic autonomy. However, the effects were not
immediate and are, as yet, by no means consistent.172 Further, though some
similarities can be discerned from the two tests, the compositional elements of
each differ considerably.173
b) TBT agreement
A far closer match to the Korea-Beef balancing test is the TBT necessity test.
Under article 2.2, the TBT prohibits States from imposing technical regula-
tions that create ‘unnecessary’ obstacles to trade. Speciﬁcally, three condi-
tions are laid down for the legitimate introduction of such regulations. First,
the regulation has to pursue a ‘legitimate goal’: though examples are given in
the provision including the protection of human and animal health, the list is
non-exhaustive. Secondly, the regulation must assist in the achievement of the
policy goal. Finally, the regulation must be ‘not more trade-restrictive than
necessary . . . taking account of the risks non-fulﬁlment would create’.174
Necessity in this provision therefore seems to require some sort of balancing
process but whether it imposes a proportionality test strictu sensu remains
subject to controversy.175 It certainly appears to provide wide scope for
169 SPS art 5.6, footnote 3. 170 Button (n 2) 71.
171 See, in particular, Brazil-Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, para 156 referred to above at fn 129.
See also US-Gambling, WT/DS285/AB/R, para 308 under the GATS. Though mentioned by the
EC-Asbestos AB, the Panel’s ﬁndings on the matter were not appealed so the AB declined to
address the issue: EC-Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, 169.
172 As seen by the fact that Korea-Beef and EC-Asbestos did not address the issue.
173 cf F Garcia, ‘The Salmon Case: Evolution of Balancing Mechanisms for Non-Trade Values
in WTO’, in Bermann and Mavroides (n 2) 150–151 who notes substantial similarity between the
test and notes the direct inﬂuence of Australia-Salmon in the development of the GATT necessity
test. 174 TBT, art 2.2.
175 Neumann and Turk (n 45) 218. cf, Hilf, who argues that this does amount to proportion-
ality: (n 48) 120. Marceau and Trachtman note that the original draft at the end of the Uruguay
Round included a footnote after the additional sentence of art 2.2 which read ‘this provision is
A Critique of the WTO Jurisprudence on‘Necessity’ 115
of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589309990091
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 07:26:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
judicial intervention, not only by awarding the adjudicating body the re-
sponsibility of deciding whether the impediment to trade outweighs the
consequences of non-fulﬁlment but, more problematically, providing scope
for it to also determine whether policy objectives not falling within the explicit
examples are legitimate. Thus, the tripartite criteria bear remarkable similarity
to the three-prong balancing test.
The resemblance could be logically explained by the fact that, like TBT
article 2.2, GATT article XX(d), to which the balancing test was ﬁrst applied,
both have similarly open-ended lists of legitimate policy goals and thus may
make the transfer of the weighing and balancing test appropriate to some
extent.176 This is because, like XX(d), a wide variety of laws and regulations
are caught by the provision thus sometimes requiring an investigation into
‘the relative importance of the common interests or values that the law or
regulations . . . is intended to protect’.177 Thus while it is useful to consider the
TBT jurisprudence on the issue, the fact that it has not been subject to direct
judicial analysis178 limits this exercise. The EC-Sardines179 case on article 2.4
provides the only suggestion of how it will be treated. The case involved
EC’s prohibition on the use of the term ‘Peruvian sardines’ on tins containing
sardine-like ﬁsh caught off the Peruvian coast which Peru claimed to be
inconsistent with TBT Article 2.4.
The issue of necessity was considered following the Panel’s decision (up-
held by the AB)180 that ‘legitimate objectives’ referred to under Article 2.4
must be interpreted in light of article 2.2.181 The Panel’s reasoning dis-
tinguished between adjudication of the policy choice as a legitimate objective
and the means chosen to achieve it. It held that the wording of Article 2.2
coupled with the TBT preamble ‘accords a degree of deference with respect to
the domestic policy objectives which Members wish to pursue’.182 It also
found that the provisions show ‘less deference’ to the means the Member
employs to achieve the objective.183 However, in the next paragraph, the
Panel went on to state that in considering the ‘legitimate objectives pursued’
under article 2.4, ‘[p]anels are . . . required to determine the legitimacy of
intended to ensure proportionality between regulations and the risks non-fulﬁlment of objectives
would create’. Though the footnote was removed, the Note from the Secretariat afﬁrmed that the
degree of restrictiveness in the context of standard setting ‘should be proportional to the risk of
non-fulﬁlment . . . in the case of the TBT’: (n 22) citing Document TER/W/16 and corr 1, (n 83)
and (n 84). 176 Neaumann and Turk (n 45) 219.
177 ibid, 220 citing Korea-Beef, WT/DS161.169/AB/R,162.
178 Though raised in a number of cases such as EC-Asbestos, EC-Measures Affecting the
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291.292.293/R, 29 September 2006 and
EC-Protection of Trade-Marks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and
Foodstuffs WT/DS290/R. 15 March 2005, the TBT necessity provisions were deemed inappli-
cable or unnecessary to consider.
179 EC-Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/R, 29 May 2002, WT/DS231/AB/R,
26 September 2002 (EC-Sardines). 180 ibid, WT/DS231/AB/R, 286.
181 EC-Sardines, WT/DS231/R, para 7.118.
182 ibid para 7.120, (emphasis added). 183 ibid.
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those objectives’,184 which was upheld by the AB.185 There is little, if any-
thing, in the text of article 2.2 to prevent an adjudicating body from applying
the article 2.4 logic to it.
On one reading of the Panel’s reasoning, it appears that they retracted the
Panel’s earlier distinction between the measure and the means employed.186
On another, closer attention to the use of the term ‘degree’ helps reconcile the
two paragraphs. That is to say, while the Panel believed it necessary to adopt a
deferential approach to considering the legitimacy of an objective, it did not
believe that the choice of policy objectives was an absolute right held by
states.187 It appears to have arrived at this conclusion by referring to the fact
that the TBT preamble limits Member autonomy by requiring that such mea-
sures do not constitute unnecessary obstacles to trade.188 However, by the
same token, it appears that the Panel restricted its own interference level by
explicitly restricting its frame of reference to be whether the objective is
‘supported by relevant public policies or other social norms’.189 This reason-
ing was echoed again in the consideration of whether gambling restriction
measures were caught by the public morals exception under the GATS in
US-Gambling and highlighted the adjudicating bodies’ concern that the
open-ended list of objectives exposes the article to abuse by governments. It
appears then that, though the TBT’s inﬂuence on the directional development
of the Korea-Beef balancing test is limited by the current lack of jurisprudence
on the issue, the impact thus far has been to tip the balance in favour of trade-
liberalization by awarding the adjudicating bodies more avenues of review
than expressly provided for in the GATT.
However, the extent to which the TBT and SPS jurisprudence is transfer-
rable to the GATT is limited. This is because the texts themselves differ so
greatly: while TBT article 2.2 and SPS article 5.6 speciﬁcally require that
technical regulations ‘not be more restrictive than necessary’ (though the SPS
replaces ‘necessary’ with ‘required’) the GATT incorporates no such refer-
ence. The difference strongly suggests that the interpretation of the word
‘necessary’ under the WTO is not synonymous with the least-restrictive
means test, because if the opposite were true there would have been no need
for the Members to draft the TBT or SPS provisions any differently from the
GATT article XX.
Despite the different textual deﬁnitions of necessity in the various agree-
ments, the jurisprudence appears to be evolving in such a way that develop-
ments under one agreement are used to inﬂuence the development of the
test under another, not merely through analogous reasoning but through the
184 ibid para 7.121. 185 EC-Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, para 286.
186 See Neumann and Turk, above (n 45) 218.
187 Camilleri, above (n 97) 26.
188 EC-Sardines, WT/DS231/R, para 7.120.
189 ibid para 7.121 referring to Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
WT/DS114/R, adopted 7 April 2000, para 7.69.
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complete transposition of criteria. While some commentators welcome the
development of a more harmonized test in the interests of legal certainty,190 it
may be that the adjudicating bodies have taken the advantages of consistency
too far towards uniformity, diminishing if not nullifying the different balances
between regulatory autonomy and trade liberalization negotiated under each
agreement, particularly the GATT.
IV. JURISPRUDENCE V THE TREATY TEXT: CONSISTENCY OR DIVERGENCE?
A. Domestic Regulatory Autonomy, Article XX, and the Korea-Beef test
The evolution of the necessity test thus far appears to be characterized by a
continuing uncertainty regarding the proper delineation of power between
Members and the adjudicating bodies with immense consequences for the
trade/non-trade debate. While many of the adjudicating bodies’ decisions
should be commended for their deferential approach in appropriate circum-
stances, the continuing failure to develop a coherent legal doctrine on the
degree of deference to be afforded to Members renders policy measures vul-
nerable to the adjudicating body’s discretion to expand its jurisdiction through
its choice of interpretative tool when applying the necessity test. The question
to address now is to what extent the current balance is supported by the treaty
text.
Given that the Korea-Beef balancing test has been recognized to still con-
stitute an LRM test, though supplemented by a balancing analysis, the critique
regarding the LRM’s lack of consistency with the treaty text outlined above191
is equally applicable. However, the ‘balancing’ aspect of the test still requires
examination. The ﬁrst and last limbs of the Korea-Beef test will be assessed
ﬁrst as it is my contention that these elements constitute the point of greatest
departure from the express content of the treaty text.
1. The importance of the value and its impact on trade
To recall, the AB introduced the balancing test to the existing LRM test in its
consideration of article XX(d). The wording used by the AB was very speciﬁc,
stating that:
[A] treaty interpreter assessing a measure claimed to be necessary to secure
compliance of a WTO-consistent law or regulation may, in appropriate cases,
take into account the relative importance of the common interests that the law or
regulation to be enforced is intended to protect.192
190 Art 3.2 of the DSU speciﬁcally endows the dispute settlement system with the responsi-
bility for providing ‘security and predictability to the multilateral trading system’. Note, however,
that the Working Party on Domestic Regulation recently reiterated that the necessity tests cannot
be used interchangeably: WTO Secretariat WPDR Note ‘“Necessity Tests” in the WTO’,
S/WPDR/W/27, 2 December 2003. 191 Part IIA(2).
192 Korea-Beef, WT/DS161.169/AB/R, para 162 (emphasis added).
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Thus, the AB’s words are highly qualiﬁed. They envisage the assessment of
the value being pursued only in relation to measures ‘claimed to be necessary
under article XX(d)’. The difﬁculties presented by an open-ended list of policy
objectives to the adjudicating bodies were touched upon by the Panel in re-
lation to TBT article 2.2.193 Under both article XX(d) and TBT article 2.2, it
appeared that concern to reconcile the competing interests embodied in the
agreements required some form of review to minimize its potential misuse for
disguised or unjustiﬁable trade restrictions. However, while there appears to
be some weight to this logic when applied to article XX(d), (the extent to
which will be explored below), it is clear that there is no logical or textual
basis for allowing the transfer of the Korea-Beef necessity test to article XX
(b) or (a). The speciﬁc enunciation of a closed list of legitimate objectives
shows that the weighing and balancing process took place at the negotiation
stage of the GATT’s creation. Each exception represents a policy goal that the
WTO community has accepted should remain uncompromised by the pursuit
of trade liberalization. Thus, provided the measure falls within one of these
legitimate exceptions, the goal’s relative value is beyond review.
The current test’s failure to recognize the balance struck by the Members in
this important regard has led to its description as ‘an anathema to judicial
restraint and national sovereignty’.194 The AB’s self-declared entitlement to
assess the relative importance of the interests or values being pursued affords
them the discretion to strike down policy measures they consider provide
disproportionate non-trade beneﬁts at the expense of free trade. The test ap-
pears to sit at odds with the purported right for Members to choose their own
level of protection.
Less evident is the scope of review that can or should be given to adjudi-
cating bodies dealing with open-listed exceptions. To give Members absolute
deference over this matter would appear to shield protectionist measures from
adjudicative scrutiny. However, two important issues arising from the lan-
guage of the text suggest that not only is this balance of power precisely
intended by the drafters but also the risk that illegitimate protectionist
measures would succeed is minimal. First, and speciﬁc to the language of
article XX(d), the text allows measures necessary to secure compliance with
only GATT-consistent laws or regulations. I suggest that this speciﬁcation
should be interpreted to be just as exhaustive as the exceptions contained
under sub-clauses (a) and (b). Thus, if the responding Member can show that
these laws or regulations are not inconsistent with the GATT,195 the measure
will succeed. If not, the measure will fail. At no point is the Panel mandated to
enquire into the relative value of the goal being pursued. This reading would
not only avoid concerns regarding the adjudicating bodies’ capacity and
193 See (n 181) and surrounding text.
194 Marceau and Trachtman (n 22) 850.
195 Dominican-Cigarettes, WT/DS302/R, para 7.209.
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legitimacy to second-guess the policy choices of sovereign Members, but also
achieve a greater degree of transparency and consistency in the adjudicating
process. I do not suggest that this measure would not be subject to signiﬁcant
scrutiny; instead, it is more appropriate for such examination to occur when
applying the article XX chapeau. The AB in Korea-Beef appears to have been
supporting this interpretation when it distinguished between the process of
assessing whether the measure was ‘necessary to secure such compliance’
and whether the measure was ‘designed to secure compliance with laws and
regulations that are not themselves inconsistent . . .’196
The content of article XX’s chapeau provides strong textual evidence that
no balancing test was envisaged in the interpretation of necessity. This is
because the chapeau fulﬁls this speciﬁc function by requiring that the measure
does not constitute a disguised, arbitrary or unjustiﬁable restriction on trade.
As outlined in the LRM analysis, to allow a cost-beneﬁt, proportionality or
balancing analysis at the stage of enquiring into the necessity of a provision
would render the analysis under the chapeau superﬂuous.197 However, the
balancing test provided for in the chapeau does not consist of the same
elements as the Korea-Beef balancing test. Instead, the chapeau:
. . . embodies the recognition on the part of WTO Members of the need to
maintain a balance of rights and obligations between the right of a Member to
invoke one or another of the exceptions of Article XX, speciﬁed in paragraphs
(a) to (j), on the one hand, and the substantive rights of the other Members under
the GATT 1994, on the other hand.198
Importantly, the AB in US-Shrimp went on to state that the interpretation
of the chapeau marks out a line of equilibrium so that the competing rights do
not ‘cancel out the other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance
of rights and obligations constructed by the Members themselves in that
agreement.’199
The AB’s words are highly signiﬁcant for the current debate. By viewing
the chapeau as the mechanism by which each right is prevented from ‘can-
celling out the other’, they implicitly afﬁrm that the rights of Members to
invoke these exceptions are of equal value to the pursuit of trade liberal-
ization. Further, they conﬁrm that the benchmark for striking an acceptable
balance under the agreement is whether it accords with the one reached by the
Members themselves. The conclusions that follow from the AB’s own state-
ments are twofold. First, the value of the goal is a matter of political
compromise reached between the Members when drafting each agreement,
thus removing such considerations from the scope of international adjudi-
cation. Secondly, as the balancing test would distort the balance reached by
196 Korea-Beef, WT/DS161.169/AB/R, para 157 (emphasis added).
197 See (n 34) and following.
198 US-Shrimp, WT/DS58/AB/R, para 156. 199 ibid para 159.
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the members by allowing the adjudicating bodies to compromise or inﬂate the
scope of autonomy in favour or at the expense of trade liberalization at its own
discretion, it is not consistent with the treaty. The balancing test implies a
hierarchy of values (with trade liberalization at the top) simply not provided
for in the treaty.200
The above analysis is equally applicable to the Korea-Beef balancing test’s
second requirement, the measure’s trade-restrictiveness. This is because it is
inextricably related to an assessment of the relative value of the goal. In
furtherance of this analysis, and as mentioned in the LRM critique above,201
any assessment of the extent of the goal’s trade-restrictiveness is not sup-
ported by the text as this would ignore the character of the necessity provisions
as exceptions to the GATT obligations.
2. The contribution of the measure to the goal
The only element of the Korea-Beef test that remains is the requirement that
the measure contributes to the stated goal. I suggest that this is the only tex-
tually supported element of the balancing test. Returning to the text of the
treaty, the ten exceptions under article XX each denote a ‘different degree or
connection’ between the stated goal and the contested measure, as recognized
by the AB itself.202 When viewing the ‘necessary’ provisions in context of the
other exceptions, it is clear that the term is used only to require the level of
connection between the policy goal and the achievement of the policy goal be
somewhat closer than the level contained in the other exceptions. It would be
odd if the opposite was true: to imply a balancing test into the meaning of
necessity and not any other of the end-means measurements would require not
only a closer connection between the measure and goal (which is supported by
the treaty text) but also permit the adjudicating body to assess the relative
value of human health but not, for example, the relative value of the products
of prison labour. As all the policy goals under article XX are speciﬁcally
pronounced as legitimate exceptions to the general GATT obligations, this
interpretation of necessity is textually untenable.
The distinction between the design of the measure and the manner of its
application as recognised in US-Shrimp adds further weight to the argument
that the consideration of necessity is simply an exercise in assessing the re-
lationship between the ends sought and the means chosen. By reafﬁrming that
200 ibid. Though the AB also mentioned that the balance was not ﬁxed, in order to maintain
consistency with its previous statements, this can only be interpreted to refer to the need for
adjudicating bodies to be ﬂexible in their application of art XX rather than providing the Panel or
AB with the jurisdiction to shift the balance as it sees ﬁt. Given the circumstances of the case
(where the facts challenged the adjudicating bodies to assess the meaning of ‘exhaustible natural
resources’ under art XX(g)), ﬂexibility was required in order to give effect to the balance con-
tained in the text of the treaty. 201 Part IIA(2).
202 US-Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 18.
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the manner of the measure’s application is only assessed when considering the
chapeau, and the design at the stage of determining whether the measure falls
within one of the article XX exceptions, it follows that the interpretation of
necessity was simply intended to be an inquiry into the purpose of the measure
and the extent to which it assists the attainment of that goal.
The texts of the SPS and TBT agreements conﬁrm this interpretation of
necessity. Of particular assistance is SPS article 2. Article 2.2 resembles the
sub-clauses of article XX by requiring that the SPS measure is applied only to
the extent necessary, while article 2.3 echoes the words of the article XX
chapeau. The distinct separation of these requirements illustrate that whether
something is necessary or not is determined purely by reference to the re-
lationship between ends and means. Further, the explicit reference in both SPS
article 5.6 and TBT article 2.2 to the least-restrictive means test demonstrates
that necessity should not be interpreted as incorporating any interpretative tool
unless explicitly provided for in the text. If the opposite were true, neither
agreement would have needed to specify that the LRM test was required as it
would have simply been inferred. Instead, the drafters chose to give effect to
the marginally different balance between free trade and regulatory autonomy
under the GATT, SPS and TBT by speciﬁcally incorporating the LRM test.
However, it should be noted that the reference to the LRM test under the SPS
and TBT is not a loose LRM test but rather an LRM test as originally under-
stood. This is because, like the exceptions under the GATT, the value of the
objectives has been determined by political negotiation and thus is beyond
review.
B. The End of Balancing?
Three of the more recent considerations of the necessity test, namely in Brazil-
Tyres and Dominican-Cigarettes, hint at a fundamental shift in the content
of the necessity test to only constitute an examination of the contribution
of the measure,203 though subsequent cases show that any preference for
change has not yet been embraced.204 Worthy of note is the manner in
which the Dominican-Cigarettes Panel expressed its task under article
XX(d). After addressing the measure’s impact on trade and the goal’s relevant
value, it stated, ‘having said that, the Panel will focus its analysis on whether
(the measure) . . . is in fact necessary to secure compliance with . . . (the
goal)’.205
This statement suggests that the ﬁrst two elements could be said to lie
outside the question of whether the measure is necessary. While this dis-
tinction was not explicitly followed by either of the adjudicating bodies in
203 See also, Colombia-Ports of Entry, WT/DS366/R.
204 See, for example, China-Publications and Audiovisual Products, WT/DS363/R.
205 Dominican-Cigarettes, WT/DS302/R, 7.215, (emphasis added).
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Brazil-Tyres, the vast majority of the judicial reasoning in both cases was
dedicated to the contribution of the goal to the intended measure.
Consideration of the value of the measure and its trade-restrictiveness was
limited in the Panel decision and given only a sentence each in the Appellate
Body report.206 This short string of jurisprudence provides a useful example of
how a necessity test paying greater respect to the language of article XX
would operate.
However, before turning to examine the necessity test in Brazil-Tyres, it is
important to recall that nothing in the language of article XX suggests that
Members did not envisage awarding any power to the adjudicating bodies in
applying the necessity provisions. On the contrary, in order to maintain the
equilibrium between competing goals, the assessment of necessity appears to
be a matter for judicial review. In this regard, cross-reference to GATT article
XXI is useful. Containing the general security exceptions, this article is lit-
tered with references to the Member’s capacity to decide whether ‘it considers
[a measure] to be necessary’.207 Article XXI does not impose any additional
threshold. In contrast, article XX’s chapeau combined with the absence of any
self-judging references strongly suggests that question of necessity was in-
tended to be reviewed by third parties.
The difﬁculties encountered by the adjudicating bodies in Brazil-Tyres
when examining the level of contribution or nexus required between the ends
pursued and means adopted, show that there remains a large and important
role for the DBS to play in the future interpretation and application of
necessity under the proposed text-based interpretation. This case concerned
Brazil’s measures relating to the prohibition on the importation of retreaded
and used tyres which Brazil claimed was necessary under article XX(b) for
reducing ‘exposure to the risks to human, animal and plant health arising from
the accumulation of waste tyres’.208 Further, Brazil claimed that an exception
to the prohibition which it afforded to Mercosur countries was necessary un-
der article XX(d).
The main point of contention on appeal was the Panel’s decision to apply a
‘qualitative’ analysis of contribution as opposed to a ‘quantitative’ one. This
was contested by the EC who argued that the ‘very indirect’ relationship
between the importation of retreaded tyres and the health risks at issue re-
quired a more ‘diligent’ examination.209 The AB upheld the Panel’s choice of
methodology arguing that the logic of allowing the risk to human health to be
assessed either quantitatively or qualitatively also applied to the analysis of
the contribution made by a measure to the reduction of that risk.210
206 Brazil-Tyres, WT/DS332/R, 7.108-7.114; WT/DS332/AB/R para.144; Van Calster also
notes the absence of a substantive weighing process: G Van Calster, ‘Faites vos jeux- Regulatory
Autonomy and the World Trade Organisation after Brazil-Tyres’ (2008) 20 J Environ L 1 121,
133. 207 See generally GATT art XXI.
208 Brazil-Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, para. 144, citing the Panel Report at para 7.102.
209 Brazil-Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, para 137. 210 ibid para 146.
A Critique of the WTO Jurisprudence on‘Necessity’ 123
of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589309990091
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 07:26:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
The AB held that in order to be considered necessary, the measure must
‘materially contribute’ to the intended goal.211 Even at ﬁrst glance, this
threshold suggests an inconsistency with the Korea-Beef AB’s determination
that the measure must be ‘closer to the pole of indispensable than merely
making a contribution’ to the policy goal. This concern is further exacerbated
by the AB’s clariﬁcation, stating that the measure could succeed not only if
evidence shows ‘a measure’s contribution to the goal in the past or present, but
also if it is apt to produce a material contribution . . .’212 The AB emphasised
that just because a contribution is not immediately observable does not mean
that it cannot be justiﬁed under article XX(b).213 After considering the
Brazilian strategy to achieve its goal, it considered the import ban to constitute
a key element of this strategy and thus ‘likely to bring a material contribution
to the achievement of its objective’.214
On one hand, the AB’ s reasoning may be argued to fall foul of consistency
with the treaty text as this lower threshold diminishes the distinctions between
the ten sub-clauses of article XX. The ‘material contribution’ test may be said
to bear closer resemblance to the relationship required under sub-clauses (c)
(‘relating to’) or (f) (‘imposed for’), especially when considering how it was
actually applied. It appears that the AB’s earlier considerations of the ordinary
meaning of necessary would assist in bolstering the legitimacy of this new
threshold and its longevity. On the other hand, the reasoning demonstrated
a concerted effort to take account of the complexity of regulatory environ-
ments. It recognized that a Member’s choice of measure is generally informed
by the broader contextual environment of culture, custom and economics
and that regulatory measures do not operate in simple isolation where cause
and effect is easily discerned. Instead, its operation must be observed and
examined as an integral part of this broader context.215 In many respects,
the reasoning represents a climax in the development of article XX juris-
prudence as it seeks to give effect to the trade/non-trade and Member/
adjudicating body equilibrium constructed in the GATT. By demonstrating
how an objective consideration of necessity can take account of the eco-
nomic, cultural and social needs and desires of its Members, the Brazil-Tyres
AB reconciles the need to afford sufﬁcient deference to Member policy
choices while ensuring this right is not abused. This is assisted by the fact
that the value and trade-restrictiveness of the measure were never sub-
stantively assessed. The measure’s subsequent failure under the chapeau in
Brazil-Tyres shows that despite the less intrusive application of the necessity
test, the two-stage analysis set out in article XX is sufﬁcient to capture
211 ibid para 150. 212 ibid para 151 (emphasis added).
213 ibid. 214 ibid para 155.
215 In rejecting the possible alternatives suggested by the EC, the AB noted that these measures
‘already ﬁgure as elements of a comprehensive strategy designed by Brazil to deal with waste
tyres. Substituting one element of this comprehensive policy for another would weaken the policy
by reducing the synergies between its components, as well as its total effect’: ibid para 172.
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measures that have unjustiﬁable discriminatory effects. The decision
entrenches deference as a fundamental guiding principle in not only the
interpretation of the treaty provisions but also in determining the facts of
the case.
It is worthy of note that the Appellate Body recently issued a landmark
ruling under the SPS agreement in US/Canada-Continued Suspension.216
This ruling, though limited to the interpretation of article 5.1 of the SPS
agreement, enunciated the proper standard of review to be one that affords
clear deference to the ﬁndings of domestic authorities with regard to ‘risk
assessment’. The decision suggests that we may be witnessing a broader
movement towards the application of a more deferential standard of review
across all the agreements. Further, given the history of cross-fertilization
between the SPS and GATT agreements, as well as the fact that the SPS
agreement is an elaboration of article XX(b) of the GATT, the decision
may have implications for the future interpretation of the GATT necessity
test. The degree of deference applied in Brazil-Tyres and explicitly enunciated
in US/Canada-Continued Suspension may provide further impetus for re-
form of the necessity test to one constructed in greater harmony with the
text of article XX, though it remains to be seen whether this will in fact be
the effect.
C. Balancing, LRM and the WTO: A Possible Future?
Finally, it is useful to brieﬂy consider whether it is desirable to incorporate
the two dominant judicial tools employed when interpreting necessity. The
application of both the balancing test and the strict LRM test has received
substantial support by different commentators. First, the LRM test (as deﬁned
in Part I as opposed to the loose LRM test which was suggested to have been
applied in Part II) is said to offer the beneﬁts of transparency and predict-
ability by requiring a ‘particularised comparison between the measure in
question and a speciﬁc proposed alternative’.217 The test is thereby said to
eliminate inefﬁciently trade-restrictive measures and avoid the ambiguities
presented by allowing the adjudicating body to question the value of the
goal.218 However, if the measure is instrumental to the achievement of the
goal (that is, if it makes more than simply a contribution) it is difﬁcult to see
how an alternative measure with less impact on trade could achieve the same
level of protection sought by the Member. The application of the LRM test
thus far demonstrates a potential danger of the test being used in a manner
that compromises or explicitly rejects the Member’s chosen level of
216 United States-Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute;
WT/DS320/AB/R, Canada-Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute,
WT/DS321/AB/R. 217 Marwell (n 16) 829.
218 ibid 828.
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protection.219 Thus, until the adjudicating bodies can show how this can be
avoided, I suggest that its application under the GATT nulliﬁes the suggested
beneﬁts by undermining the protection afforded to domestic regulatory
autonomy contained in the text. The validity of this concern is supported by
the presence of safeguards for the level of protection expressly contained in
the SPS and TBT provisions, thus minimising the potential threat posed by the
LRM test.
The Korea-Beef balancing test has also been seen to assist the WTO ad-
judicating bodies to give effect to the dual objectives, mainly by providing
greater ﬂexibility to the assessment process.220 This ﬂexibility is said to allow
a greater number of factors to be taken into account and thus ‘eases the jus-
tiﬁcatory burden for a member to protect its violating regulations’.221
However, the degree of discretion the test affords to the adjudicating bodies is
the greatest point of concern for the adjudication of non-trade values in a
consistent and transparent manner. This concern has manifested itself on nu-
merous occasions as demonstrated in the comparative analysis of the test’s
application.222 Given the sensitive issues such balancing tests need to con-
sider, a strong sense of democratic legitimacy needs to be present before a
body purports to undertake any such exercise.223 Neumann and Turk point to
a number of ongoing problems facing the WTO, suggesting that it is not yet
ready to begin employing balancing tests, though they speciﬁcally refer to
the inappropriateness of a proportionality test.224 Amongst others, they cite
the access problems facing developing countries and other stakeholders in the
formation and application of rules as well as the fact that ‘not even all
the major cultures and legal families seem to be adequately represented in the
Appellate Body’.225 This can be contrasted not only with the ECJ in which
every State has a judge of its own nationality, but also other international
courts with similarly large numbers of Members such as the ICJ and ITLOS,
which both allow for introduction of ad hoc judges.226
The current lack of predictability or certainty in the test’s application,
coupled with the opaque application of the balancing test strongly suggest that
the introduction of balancing processes where the value of the goal is assessed
relative to the impact on trade by the adjudicating body is premature at the
very least. The protracted negotiations that have taken place over whether to
introduce an expanded non-exhaustive list of exceptions and/or the introduc-
tion of a proportionality test to GATS VI:4227 demonstrate not only how
difﬁcult these issues are to resolve in accordance with the aims of the agree-
ment but also that the decision is ultimately a product of political negotiation,
not a judicial one.
219 See Korea-Beef, Thai-Cigarettes, US-Gambling.
220 Osiro (n 84) 140. 221 ibid.
222 See Part II generally. 223 Neumann and Turk (n 45) 232.
224 ibid 232. Howse and Turk (n 2) 326. 225 ibid.
226 ibid. 227 See Kennet et al (n 64) 6–9.
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V. CONCLUSION
The need to ensure that the domestic regulatory freedom contained in the
treaty is not abused by Members is logically an issue of concern for the future
viability of the WTO system. However, this need has seen the adjudicating
bodies develop the necessity tests in a manner that distorts the trade liberal-
ization/domestic autonomy equilibrium contained in the treaty. By expanding
the adjudicating bodies’ jurisdiction and discretion through the use of the
LRM and balancing tests, signiﬁcant controversy has been generated over the
adjudicating bodies’ competence and legitimacy to weigh the value of regu-
latory goals against their negative trade effects.
I have argued that as the treaty text provides adequate safeguards for
the proper review of the uses of the exception clauses by Members and as
the freedom to pursue certain goals has already been agreed upon by the
Members during the negotiation of the treaty, the continued operation of both
the LRM and Korea-Beef balancing tests are not only textually unsupportable
but an illegitimate and unwarranted intrusion into Members’ autonomy.
Instead, I have proposed an alternative test that gives proper effect to the
article XX sub-clauses and chapeau and offers a more transparent legal
standard against which these measures can be assessed. Finally, and most
signiﬁcantly, the test meets the challenge of eliminating protectionist mea-
sures while preserving domestic regulatory autonomy. The task of identifying
illegitimate protectionist measures disguised under the necessity provisions
clearly requires independent, and often relatively intrusive, adjudication.
However, this must be done in a manner that pays due respect to the nego-
tiated compromise achieved by the Members. Such recognition is imperative
if the WTO adjudicating bodies are to retain their legitimacy and the
Members’ cooperation.
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